Deception as Cooperation

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  • Additional Information
    • Publication Date:
    • Abstract:
      I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with `functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories.
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  • Citations
    • ABNT:
      MARTÍNEZ, M. Deception as Cooperation. [s. l.], 2019. Disponível em: . Acesso em: 22 nov. 2019.
    • AMA:
      Martínez M. Deception as Cooperation. 2019. Accessed November 22, 2019.
    • APA:
      Martínez, M. (2019). Deception as Cooperation. Retrieved from
    • Chicago/Turabian: Author-Date:
      Martínez, Manolo. 2019. “Deception as Cooperation.”
    • Harvard:
      Martínez, M. (2019) ‘Deception as Cooperation’. Available at: (Accessed: 22 November 2019).
    • Harvard: Australian:
      Martínez, M 2019, ‘Deception as Cooperation’, viewed 22 November 2019, .
    • MLA:
      Martínez, Manolo. Deception as Cooperation. 2019. EBSCOhost,
    • Chicago/Turabian: Humanities:
      Martínez, Manolo. “Deception as Cooperation,” 2019.
    • Vancouver/ICMJE:
      Martínez M. Deception as Cooperation. 2019 [cited 2019 Nov 22]; Available from: