Common Belief of Rationality in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

• Authors : Stuart, Harborne W ^{††I thank Adam Brandenburger for immeasurable help with this paper. Extensive advice and comments from an anonymous associate editor is greatly appreciated. I also thank Rena Henderson, John Hillas, Jeff Keisler, Vijay Krishna, Richard Meyer, Klaus Nehring, Howard Raiffa, Phil Reny, Julie Yao, the participants in the 1993 Summer Workshop of the Stanford Institute of Theoretical Economics, and an anonymous referee. Financial support from the Harvard Business School Division of Research is gratefully acknowledged.}

• Source: In Games and Economic Behavior April 1997 19(1):133-143

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Free and perfectly safe but only partially effective vaccines can harm everyone.

• Authors : Talamàs E; IESE Business School, Spain.; Vohra R

• Source: Games and economic behavior [Games Econ Behav] 2020 Jul; Vol. 122, pp. 277-289. Date of Electronic Publication: 2020 May 08.Publisher: Elsevier Country of Publication: United States NLM ID: 101275006 Publication Model: Print-Electronic Cited Medium: Print ISSN:

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